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North-Holland
How to improve our understanding
of group decision making with the help
of Artificial Intelligence
Wim B.G. Liebrand *
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
Within science we primarily obtain knowledge of a specific field by reading the published results
of theoretical and empirical studies. It is argued that this approach may lead to a biased and
incomplete perspective of a research area. It is proposed to also use methods from Artificial
Intelligence to elicit, model and use the knowledge of experts. It is expected that especially their
heuristic knowledge is relevant for problem solving and consultancy applications. An illustrative
example concludes the paper.
Understanding group decision making has proven to be an impor-
tant and complex task for many researchers within various disciplines.
Previous research has described both the ways in which interdepen-
dent people go about solving problems and making decisions as well
as how they should have made them.
In the area of group decision making we observe major departures
from what in terms of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory would
be called rational decision making. The elegant mathematical world of
decision making obviously does not sufficiently match reality. In light
of the rather stringent assumptions being made it seems not very
surprising that we cannot call man an SEU-rational' decision maker.
People normally do not have available complete information about all
utility functions involved, and as a consequence they are not in the
position to carry out the required numerical operations. What is more,
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completing this paper.
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even if all the necessary information were available, their limited
capacity for information processing would impede such operations.
On the other hand, empirical research on group decision making
and problem solving shows that people transform the structure of the
decision setting according to their individual outcome preferences,
their short- and long-term strategic goals, and their selective percep-
tion of complex structures. These numerous and diverse empirical
research findings, however, add to the complexity of the field and as a
consequence we currently lack a comprehensive theory of decision
making in interdependent settings, which integrates the variety of
theoretical and empirical research findings. This state of affairs, of
course, is undesirable both for the understanding of decision making
and in a more applied sense for consultancy applications.
The major aim of the present paper is to provide a possible way to
integrate previous research findings in a pragmatic way, thereby
allowing researchers and consultants to make better use of those
findings. We will try to accomplish that by using recent developments
in the field of artificial intelligence. Although the present line of
reasoning is applicable to various research areas, we will focus primar-
ily on the domain of decision making in groups in which the well-being
of the group members is affected by the decisions taken by the group
members. There are two reasons for selecting this domain. First, the
author has conducted a few studies in this area. The more important
reason, however, is that the study of group decision making relies
heavily on game theory and experimental games. The indirect advan-
tage then is that this highly formalized research paradigm could be a
perfect domain for the artificial intelligence approach outlined below.
Artificial Intelligence
In the last decade we have observed an ever increasing role of
computers in empirical research. Initially, the computer was primarily
used to carry out numerical operations, but after the introduction of
the personal computer in the early eighties we have witnessed an
exponential growth in the capabilities and availability of desktop
computers. The computer is now in use in every phase of empirical
research and a regular desktop computer is able to carry out millions
of instructions per second. This provides a powerful tool for analyzing
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highly complex situations. As an example one might think of the
allocation of passengers to planes and planes to flight schedules with
the objective to minimize costs. The human mind is not very well
equipped to perform such a task within a reasonable amount of time.
Despite this 'brute' computational force, and despite several pre-
dictions (e.g. Simon and Newell 1958), the computer is still not able to
beat the world's chess champion, and it will surely not be able to
`discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem' for a
long time. In contrast, experts generally are capable of finding intu-
itively and almost instantaneously the relevant patterns out of many
thousands of different configurations. Experts tend to have a so-called
`tuned awareness' with which they selectively perceive, process, store
and recall information. They have strategies for storing and retrieving
information or knowledge sets in short- and long-term memory (Tuthill
1990). Access to these strategies would of course be very beneficial to
computer applications as well as to non-experts in the field. Next we
will discuss this possibility in more detail.
Ordered levels of knowledge
Knowledge may be defined as the result of a process of synthesis in
which information is compared to other information and combined
into meaningful links (Tuthill 1990). In this view, incoming informa-
tion is interpreted within an already established personal knowledge
framework. This knowledge framework forms a scheme which serves
as a model for matching and comparing the incoming information with
the current problem set. Within this framework Tuthill distinguishes
four levels of knowledge.
Facts are relationships between objects, symbols and events. They
can be represented by traditional data structures and are considered
to be the lowest level of knowledge. Concepts are facts which are
grouped with respect to common attributes. Concepts are hierarchi-
cally organized in such a way that the lower-level concepts inherit
attributes of the ancestor concepts. Rules are the next level of knowl-
edge. They operate on facts and concepts. Rules can be conceived of
as guides for action and consist of IF–THEN statements representing
conditions and actions to take in deductive problem solving. The
highest level of knowledge is described in Tuthill's taxonomy as
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Heuristic Knowledge. Heuristic knowledge is especially relevant in
problem solving. In facing new problem situations, rather than using
rule algorithms, shortcuts and combinations of rules are applied. In
fact, heuristic knowledge is the personal synthesis of facts, concepts
and rules.
The use of heuristic knowledge from experts
The importance of heuristic knowledge seems surprising given the
fact that our common understanding of decision making processes
consists of facts, concepts and rules. These levels of knowledge are
easiest to transfer by means of articles, books and lectures. Heuristic
knowledge, or the set of personal rules of thumb, is not normally
transferred to others as acquired knowledge. There are several rea-
sons to see this as a highly undesirable situation. The most important
of them might be the potential of heuristic strategies to efficiently find
solutions to problems. Knowledge about problem-solving strategies is
essential because it provides insight into the domain itself. Experts in
the field of, for example, group decision making, not only possess
knowledge of a large amount of facts, concepts and rules in that
research area, they also have heuristic knowledge which transcends
rule knowledge. Especially this heuristic knowlede is used in case
novel situations are encountered. What is applied in these novel
problem situations is a selective synthesis of facts, concepts, and rules
previously acquired. All in all they have access to a very complex
personal knowledge base which is constantly evolving and which they
constantly use in their reasoning about the field. The problem, of
course, is that these experts tend to be few in number and mostly not
available in case a problem needs to be solved.
The question now arises as to whether it is possible to profit from
the heuristic knowledge acquired by experts without having to contact
them personally. A tentative answer might be affirmative and related
to what 'knowledge engineers' are trying to accomplish. A knowledge
engineer tries to emulate expert problem solving in a computer
program. In theory their task is simple: elicit knowledge from experts
and then organize and represent it in such a way that it can be used by
a computer. In practice, knowledge engineers have encountered sev-
eral problems and 'bottlenecks'.
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However, it is only fair to note that substantial progress has been
made in this field. As Harmon (1991) points out, knowledge-based
systems and expert systems, are slowly recovering from a highly
skeptical phase in which, after initial enthusiasm, everybody seemed
to know why expert systems could not work. Knowledge engineers
have now access to several techniques for knowledge elicitation,
including structured interviews, protocol analysis, repertory grid and
various psychometric scaling techniques. Several methods have also
been developed for representing the expert's knowledge in a knowl-
edge-based system. Among the commonly used approaches we find
semantic networks, production rules, scripts, frames, repertory grids
and object-oriented approaches. All these approaches have their
specific advantages and disadvantages. It is not my intention to discuss
this in detail (see for example: Gammack 1987; Greenwell 1988; Hart
1989; Parsaye and Chignell 1988). For present purposes it is sufficient
to allude to the possibility of representing heuristic knowledge of
experts in the field of group decision making.
The domain of group decision making
Decision making in situations of outcome interdependency involves
actors whose decisions have reciprocal consequences on their well-
being. A convenient way to display different classes of decision mak-
ing within this domain is shown in fig. 1.
The classification is based on whether the interests of the actors
consist of a harmonious set of overlapping interests, a set of compet-
ing interests, or a mixture of overlapping and competing interests. The
assumed amount of intrapersonal conflict is depicted on the vertical
axis. That is, we assume that in case the actors' interests coincide,
there will be no ambiguity in what one ought to do, hence actors know
for sure that it is in their own interest to cooperate (e.g. sailing a
boat). On the opposite side of the horizontal dimension of fig. 1, we
again expect low levels of intrapersonal conflict. Here we are dealing
with zero sum settings in which gains for one party imply equal losses
for the other. Hence, one `ought' to compete in these situations.












Fig. 1. A taxonomy of decision making under settings of outcome interdependency.
Intrapersonal levels of conflict are high in between strictly coordi-
native and competitive forms of interpersonal relationships. These are
situations of partial conflict and involve relationships within which one
has the opportunity to both cooperate and compete. Such relation-
ships of partial conflict turn out to be somewhat difficult to describe
for reasons of terminology. As Schelling (1973) observes, it is both
interesting and puzzling that though we have words to describe
individuals in relationships of coordination, e.g., 'partners', 'team
members', 'cooperators' and 'collaborators', as well as ones in rela-
tionships of strict competition, e.g., 'enemies', 'adversaries', and 'op-
ponents', we do not appear to have similar terms that describe
relationships of the partial conflict variety. Strangely, this is the case
even though such relationships are highly dominant in wars, strikes,
athletic contests, classrooms, relationships between faculty members,
and even in marriages. In each of these, the participants find them-
selves in relationships in which their goals are partly correspondent,
and partly in competition with interdependent others. In short, the
participants are in a mixed-motive form of relationship. If participants
wish to maintain this relationship, they must both receive and deliver
rewards to the other, activities generally associated with coordination.
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On the other hand, they are also likely to want to obtain the maximum
out of a relationship at minimal cost. To the extent that maximum is
defined either by the situation, or by their own values as attaining an
increased share of a jointly controlled resource at some cost to the
other, the relationship also has a strictly competitive or a conflictual
component.
This situation in which the decision maker is caught in the dilemma
either to cooperate or compete has been a central research topic in
the social and behavioral sciences after the important book of Luce
and Raiffa (1957). They laid the foundation for the development of
experimental games which can be used as research tools to test
predictions derived from formal game theory. The most widely used
experimental game is the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). It con-
cerns a situation in which each decision maker is best off acting in his
or her own self interest, regardless of what the other persons do. Each
self-interested action, however, creates a negative outcome or cost for
the other people who are involved. When a large number of people
make the self-interested choice, the costs or negative outcomes accu-
mulate creating a situation in which everybody would have done
better had they decided not to act in their own short term interest.
One of the reasons for its popularity is that the PDG resembles
various real life situations of conflict.
An example of a real-life PDG is the decision to pollute. Pollution
problems can be found at various levels of decision making, ranging
from individuals to nations. For example at the industrial level, no
matter what other chemical industries may do to get rid of their
chemical waste, it is cheaper to have the waste dumped at some
rubbish-dump, or alternatively, in the ocean, than to take care of an
adequate solution. The ultimate long-term consequences of this selfish
act have to be shared by all individuals. At the individual level the
slogan `every litter bit hurts' nicely reflects the negative consequences
accompanying the decision to pollute. Though all individuals would
like to avoid the long-term negative consequences, it remains cheaper
and simpler for them to keep polluting as anonymous individuals, no
matter what the others are doing. As a consequence 'rational behav-
ior' leads to a collective disaster.
The major advantage in using experimental games lies in the
amount of control the experimenter has over the decision-making
situation. This advantage combined with the possibility to study very
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appealing situations of conflict resulted in a veritable flood of experi-
mental gaming studies. By now, several thousands of studies have
been published in this area, a number which makes it effectively
impossible to consider them all. In a recent review in this area
(Liebrand et al. 1992) the following factors were identified as being
capable of affecting levels of cooperation in PDG and PDG-like
settings:
– monetary payoff structure;
– structure and interpretation of outcome setting;
– availability of communication;










– and intergroup structure.
This list of factors surely is not an exhaustive taxonomy. It is more a
list of convenient headings for groups of studies known to the authors.
Each of the above factors will affect cooperation levels in a compli-
cated way, e.g. obtained levels of cooperation tend not to be a linear
function of group size, suggesting that we really need to consider
interactions between factors in the above list. As was said before, an
integrative framework guiding such research does not exist at the
moment and would also be extremely difficult to construct using the
traditional approach.
Towards a comprehensive view of research on group decision making
Within science we primarily obtain knowledge of a specific field by
reading the published results of theoretical and empirical studies. As
long as we can be sure that the body of knowledge for that research
area is adequately covered in the literature, there seems to be nothing
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wrong with this approach. On second thought, however, this approach
may lead to a biased and incomplete perspective.
It might be biased because studies that failed to produce significant
results tend not to be published. Speaking from my own experience in
the field of social dilemma research, I know of several studies from
different laboratories, which failed to find systematic differences for a
specific type of framing effect. Almost all of these studies never got
published, a few which found such differences were. It would there-
fore be unlikely that somebody draws a valid conclusion with regard to
the effects of this specific manipulation, based on what has been
published in this area. The example might seem an exception and
insignificant; I am afraid, however, it is not the only one.
The perspective of a research area if based on studying published
research findings might be incomplete because, as indicated earlier, it
primarily contains the lower levels of knowledge. It concerns mainly,
facts, objects, and rules related to knowledge, while heuristic knowl-
edge is underrepresented severely. This kind of high-level knowledge
normally is transferred in small workgroups of expert researchers only.
Incomplete or not, the sheer number of published research findings
in the area of group decision making renders it almost impossible to
identify and integrate the major features of these findings into a
theoretical model. What we need here are some inspired guesses or
heuristics to search for recognizable patterns. It is therefore desirable
to have access to the heuristic knowledge of expert researchers. What
we would like to know is how the expert identifies threads in research
findings on the basis of which a specific interpretation is chosen out of
all possible interpretations. And, in addition, what we also would like
to know is how experts go about solving those highly complicated
problems with which we confront our undergraduates.
An AI approach
Experts can be used as providers of information, problem-solvers
and explainers (Hart 1989). More specific to the area of decision
making in situations of outcome interdependency we might use ex-
perts to specify recognizable patterns in the voluminous research
literature, to identify major issues and problems, and to generate a set
of possible solutions to specific problem domains. Such an approach is
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a major departure from the way in which we usually develop knowl-
edge of a particular domain.
First, the development will be a task for multiple experts instead of
one. From a methodological point of view, the advantage is obvious: it
is more reliable to have several estimators instead of one. No matter
how good one expert might be, both in terms of declarative and
procedural knowledge, the combination of expertise from several
individuals is an efficient way to get rid of idiosyncracies.
Eliciting knowledge from experts in the proposed way has the
advantage that the resulting knowledge base is highly efficient. The
knowledge engineer knows that the acquired knowledge has to be
represented in such a way that it can be used in a computer program.
As a consequence the knowledge has to be functional with respect to
the requirements of the system agreed upon earlier. Irrelevant facts,
concepts and rules therefore tend to disappear.
The third advantage lies in the broader domain covered by the
experts' knowledge, and more important, the broader domain to
which their common heuristic knowledge applies. As a consequence, a
group of experts is more flexible in dealing with highly complex
situations than a single expert will be. In addition, small group
judgment tends to be better than individual judgment and offers the
possibility of selecting the optimum solution to a set problem
(Greenwell 1988).
On the negative side, it is obvious that the logistics of dealing with
several experts are far from being trivial. The use of multiple experts
with slightly different fields of expertise requires a study of the
overlap of the different domains as well as a thorough study of the
ultimate goal of this knowledge elicitation process.
With respect to this goal we have to be modest. One of the
prominent criticisms of artificial intelligence is that AI-researchers
promised far too much. What we obviously will not obtain in the near
future is an expert system for the construction of theoretical frame-
works in the area of decision making. However, in my opinion it is
realistic to expect significant progress by using knowledge elicitation
techniques on a small group of experts in a well-defined domain of
decision making.
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A concrete example
An example to illustrate the AI approach can be found in the
problem of allocating resources. Imagine a supervisor gets a sizeable
amount of money as appreciation for the performance of a small
group of employees. Our task is to construct a system to advise the
supervisor about the impact of possible distributive rules. A computer-
ized system may be cheaper in the long run than hiring experts as
consult ants.
Given this problem, the next step will be the actual elicitation of
knowledge from experts. Broadly speaking this can be done in two
ways. The first is 'task oriented' in which the expert is solving the
problem and then is observed or interviewed or gets the instruction to
think aloud during problem solving. The second is 'solution oriented'
in which the expert compares several solutions with the help of
structured techniques like Repertory Grids, Multidimensional Scaling
and Cluster Analysis. In the present example we follow a method
proposed by Butler and Corter (1986) and try to avoid idiosyncracy in
the elicitation method used by combining several of them, i.e. pairwise
comparisons, two different scaling techniques and a structured inter-
view (Passchier and Glaudé 1992).
First an American and a Japanese expert in the field of resource
allocation were asked to jointly generate several distributive rules
(table 1). Next they separately had to compare these rules on a
pairwise basis with respect to their similarity. No instruction was given
pertaining to the dimension of these similarity ratings. The similarity
matrix was then analyzed by a traditional hierarchical cluster analysis
Table 1
Distributive rules generated by the experts.
1. Equal. Divide equally, each gets the same amount
2. Performance. Divide according to performance. The best performer gets the most, etc.
3. Need. Divide by giving the most needy person the most, etc.
4. Future performance. Divide so as to increase the future performance of the group as much as
possible.
5. Seniority. Give the person who has been with the company the longest the most, etc.
6. Themselves. Let the employees themselves decide how to divide the bonus.
7. Salary. Give each employee the same fraction of his or her salary.
8. Age. Give the oldest person the most, etc.
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and by a Pathfinder network analysis (McDonald and Schwaneveldt
1988). The latter can be considered to be a generalization of a basic
tree. Networks, however, are less restrictive than basic trees, because
it is possible for a path of node-links to start and end in the same
node. It has been shown that this technique yields information which
does not show up in the hierarchical cluster analysis (Passchier and
Glaudé 1992). Figs. 2a and 2b show the tree and network representa-
tion of the eight distributive rules for the American and Japanese
expert, respectively. Global inspection shows that both experts differ
in their representation. More information about these differences is
obtained during the structured interview, the last phase of this ap-
proach.
Dendrogram using Complete Linkage
Rescaled Distante Cluster Combine





NEED 3PERFORM 2FUT_PER 4
Fig. 2a. Solution for the American expert. Top: Hierarchical clustering solution (SPSS); vertical
lines denote joined clusters; the smaller the distante the more similar the rules. Bottom:
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Fig. 2b. Solution for the Japanese expert.
In the last phase, both analyses of the similarity matrix serve as
input for a structured interview with the expert in order to elicit the
unique features of specific distributive rules or sets of similar distribu-
tive rules. The interview itself is structured on the basis of the tree
representation. That is, the expert is asked first to indicate the
difference between the two most similar distributive rules. Next, the
expert needs to specify the difference between, on the one hand, the
two most similar rules and, on the other hand, the first distributive
rule linking with the first cluster. This process is repeated until the
J
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Table 2
Results of interview with expert A based on hierarchical cluster analysis.
1. Seniority vs. Age
Difference relates to length of employment in that organization
2. Seniority +Age vs. Salary
Salary is external attribute and expresses the summary of the organization's evaluation of
employee
3. Equal vs. Themselves
Distribution by Themselves might create interpersonal conflicts unless they opt for Equal
4. Equal+ Themselves (ET) vs. Seniority +Age + Salary (SAS)
– Two distinct categories
– For SAS there is implicit acknowledgemt that either of the three is a fair rule, whereas ET
does not presume an a priori rule
5. Need vs. ET + SAS
Need is a third category
6. Current performance vs. Future performance
Retro- or prospective view
7. Performance vs. other rules
Performance and Salary should have connection
– Performance ( + salary) related to motivation and ability
whole tree representation has been covered. In this way the linkage
pattern generates the stimuli to elicit the unique features of the
different distributive rules. Tabie 2 presents a list of these unique
features for the American expert.
For the Pathfinder representation basically the same procedure is
used whereby the expert has to indicate differences and resemblances
of the various (sets of) rules. Some of this information will be
redundant, not all however. First of all, the American expert indicates
the existence of the three categories which are nicely clustered in the
Pathfinder representation. During the Pathfinder interview the Amer-
ican expert became aware of the very central position of the salary-re-
lated rule in his conceptualization. Moreover, the relation between
`performance' and `salary' is considered to be better represented in
the Pathfinder than in the Tree representation.
However, the allocation of resources clearly taps on cross-cultural
differences. Especially the Pathfinder interview shows the differences
between experts. In terms of the Japanese expert the most easy
distributive rule will be to take salary, immediately followed by age
and seniority. However, in case all employees are young and the
amount of money to be distributed is low, the equality rule might be
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the most appropriate. A central point for the Japanese expert is
minimalization of conflict. This is illustrated by statements such as,
`the performance rules are bad solutions because workers are a family
and you should not differentiate between family members'. To let the
employees decide themselves is also a bad solution in Japan because it
is 'not done' to talk about bonuses, money or need: Samurai do not
claim their hunger'.
The type of knowledge system that is represented in figs. 2a and 2b
becomes maximally useful when the different rules for allocating
resources are linked to different conditions, goals, or constraints. All
of the rules that are included in the representation might be appropri-
ate under some set of circumstances, so the final task in the creation
of the system is to specify those correspondences. Again, it is the
knowledge of the experts that provides the links.
A couple of simple examples can illustrate this component. First, it
is obvious that if one were going to use the system to advise a
Japanese manager on the allocation of a bonus to his staff, one would
rely on the segment of the system that was created by Japanese
experts. The rules that are appropriate in the United States may well
be inappropriate in Japan and vice versa. Thus, one important type of
condition that would have to be specified is the culture context of the
application.
The manager's goals are also important. Considerable research has
indicated that equal divisions are to be preferred if a major goal of the
allocation is to promote cohesion and harmony in the group. How-
ever, if the manager wants to use the allocation to maximize the
efficiency or the output of the group, than he would be advised to use
a performance-based rule. In many real applications the manager
might want to accomplish both goals. It would be easy to have the
manager specify weights that reflect the relative importance of his
objectives, and to use the weights so that an appropriate fraction of
the allocation is made by one rule and the remainder by another or
others. The final allocation would reflect the mixture of the allocator's
goals.
Finally, the system could be designed so that allocations could be
recommended, subject to commonly occurring constraints. For in-
stance, one might want to make allocations based on past perfor-
mance, subject to the constraint that no person gets more than twice
as much as another. A different type of constraint might be to set a
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maximum and/or minimum allocation, and then to allocate the
bonuses in proportion to salary, within these limits.
The rules that are included in the expert's data base can be tested
for utility by determining the conditions, goals, or constraints under
which a rule would be used. If there are no circumstances under
which a rule would be used, then the rule can be safely eliminated
from the structure.
In conclusion, it appears that this approach to elicit knowledge
from experts is an effective way to make use of the personalized
knowledge they have obtained. The overall total amount of time
invested in this illustrative example was not more than two days. In
addition, the representation of this expert knowledge is sufficiently
concrete to use in a knowledge-based computer program. On a more
substantial level, even though the example was set up for illustrative
purposes, it nicely demonstrates the importance of cultural differences
in reward allocation. It is obvious, however, that a more useful
implementation also has to specify different conditions, goals and
constraints, while it should be based on the knowledge of more than
one expert per culture. In my opinion, such an approach would lead to
the identification of those facts, concepts and rules that do matter in
problem solving. Hence it has considerable value for both theoretical
and applied purposes.
Conclusions
It was observed that the area of group decision making currently
lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework which integrates the
numerous theoretical and empirical research findings. This state of
affair probably does not differ from most research areas in the
behavioral and social sciences. In addition to the volume of published
studies, it might be possible that the published research findings
present a distorted view of the existing body of knowledge in a field,
and/or represent mainly the lower level types of knowledge.
As a potential solution to this problem we proposed that methods
from Artificial Intelligence could be useful to elicit and represent
experts' knowledge of facts, concepts, rules and especially their
heuristic knowledge in such a way that could be implemented in a
computer program. After implementation, the knowledge-based sys-
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tem could then assist in decision making in novel situations, based on
the synthesis of the experts' knowledge of relevant research findings.
The major advantage for the user would be the immediate access to
the existing high quality knowledge in that field, without the need to
have to study irrelevant material.
More important, however, is the realization that besides the tradi-
tional ways to gain knowledge, promising new methods have ap-
peared.
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